



## NEPP ETW 2021




### **MODEL- AND TESTING-BASED ASSURANCE OF CACHE MEMORY OF A SINGLE-BOARD COMPUTING SYSTEM IN RADIATION ENVIRONMENTS**

- Vanderbilt University: M. Reaz, P. Koncelik, A. F. Witulski, B. Bhuva, G. Karsai, N. Mahadevan, M. W. Rony, K. Li, B. Sierawski, A. L. Sternberg, R. A. Reed, and R. D. Schrimpf
- Alphacore Inc.: M. Turowski

# Acronyms and Abbreviations



# COTS component in Space




NASA Goddard Space Flight Center SpaceCube v1.5 in CubeSat-like form factor featuring commercial Xilinx technology

In some orbits, or with sufficient shielding, commercial electronics are almost as reliable as rad-hard electronics

C. Wilson & A. George, IEEE Aerospace Conf., 2016

# Performance: COTS Components under Radiation in Space



## Failure Mode Effects & Criticality Analysis

- Dynamic fault tree model
- Nested function-component dependence
- Identify the components with unknown criticality
- Experiment to measure the failure cross-section

- ❑ What is the minimal change in design/ component that would improve the reliability of a system with COTS component in space?
- ❑ Known failure rate for DDR and FLASH memory
- ❑ The failure rate for SRAM and CPU/GPU subsystems is not known especially within the context of a specific architecture, hardware, and OS configuration

**Radiation tolerance is expected to vary depending on the hardware selection and mitigation by software design**

# STTR Phase II : Testing of COTS Systems in Space Radiation Environments

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
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- NASA STTR 2019 Phase II Solicitation from Langley Research Center
- T6.05 Testing of COTS Systems in Space Radiation Environments

From the RFP: Investigate the feasibility of COTS electronics for *High Performance Computing (HPC)* in *space environments which are already heavily shielded*. It seeks strategies *based on a complete system analysis of HPC COTS* that include, but not limited only to, *failure modes* to mitigate radiation induced impacts to potential HPC systems in those highly shielded space environments.


# Operation and Memory Access Flow of Computers

## Uniprocessor CPU



Black lines — data flow  
Red lines — control flow

Control Flow is more complex than data flow




**Radiation Reliability of CPU & Cache Memory are largely unknown**

# Computing Board Under Study: BeagleBone Black (BBB)

- CPU – Integer Core
- GPU – Neon Core (Floating point calculation, vectorized data processing)
- Memory – Cache, SRAM, EEPROM, FLASH, MMC, SD, ECC
- Interface –  $\mu$ SD,  $\mu$ HDMI, Ethernet, JTAG, GPIO, PWM, Serial, SPI, and I2C


- Open-source community
- No heatsink on processor-SE Tests
- Good availability
- Low Power – Arm Instruction

BBB ~ smallest building block of high-performance computing



# Dynamic Fault-Tree

Maps functions to failures through components




- Failures in uPs can be induced from a sequence of events
- Hierarchical function-component dependence captures the sequence-dependent behavior

Simplified diagram shown here for brevity. Derived behavior are possible to be nested at any order.

# FMECA Analysis: Dynamic Fault Tree Model for BBB

Rate, origin, and/or type of radiation induced failures are less known for cache, CPU, and GPU/FPU



Modeled in SEAM  
 @ <https://modelbasedassurance.org/>

# Candidate Computing Board: BeagleBone Black (BBB)



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- Configurable CPU and GPU via open-source tool
- Allow placement of data and execution in user-defined core and memory units
- Parallel read access of CPU memory through execution cycle
- JTAG interfaces enable real-time debug
- Configurable ECC and parity mode for L2 cache


Access to failure monitor flags (control-registers) via JTAG interface.

Goal : Distinguish the type and **origin** of faults in the  $\mu$ P chip including Cache memory.

Challenge : Several SEU-induced faults are not traceable due to system complexity (CPU hang-ups). ECC can mask the origin of the failures.

Proposed Solution : Distinguish memory R/W and access faults to those in control registers.

# Benchmark Software Tests



Entire SOC is irradiated including cache, and execution units:

- ECC Correction only in L2 Cache (Data + Instruction)
- No Bit Interleaving
- Sorting in CPU
- Matrix Multiplication in GPU (Neon Coprocessor)
- Data and code is placed in CPU cache (irradiated)
- HEAP, STACK is placed in DDR (unirradiated)
- Transferrable algorithms written in C
- System controls in ARM assembly (unique to AM335x  $\mu$ P)
- Tests are repeatable for other computing hardware system.

Hardware configurations and software implementations are done by minimalistic open-sourced real-time operating system by vendor (Texas Instruments).

Guidelines followed from  
H. Quinn, et al., TNS, 2015


# Results (Work in Progress)

Radiation Source: Americium


Flux: 1000 alphas/mm<sup>2</sup>-sec

Source to target distance in Air: 2 cm

### Sorting Algorithm




### Matrix Multiplication Algorithm




# Results (Work in Progress)

## Sorting Algorithm



## Matrix Multiplication Algorithm



# L2 Cache Error: Data and Instruction Memory (Work in Progress)



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Algorithm	Data Fault in L2	Instruction Fault in L2	Total Number of Faults in IC
Sorting	4	2	45
Matrix Multiplication	4	4	35

SE-induced failures in L2 cache is a significant fraction to that of the total failures in  $\mu$ P IC

To monitor the L1 cache during static tests would be interesting ~ work in progress



Dynamic Fault Tree analysis provide the critical components of functionality——helps identify subsystems for testing



Derived method for independent measurement of the multi-core  $\mu$ P subsystems



Preliminary results show promise for differentiating errors originated in CPU and FPU.